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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TIMPANOGOS HIGHLANDS, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 13,936

EMILY D. HARPER and
MAX D. HARPER,
DefendantsRespondents.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by a purchaser, the appellant herein, against
sellers, the respondents herein, for specific performance of a
real estate contract entered into on September 15, 1957. The
sellers claim the buyer abandoned the contract.

The sellers also

counterclaim for slander of title as a result of the buyer's
recording of the contract on May 1, 1972 and a subsequent assignment on December 27, 1973.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court submitted the question of abandonment to an
eight member advisory jury.

The jury and the court found that

the plaintiff had abandoned the contract.

The court thereupon

entered judgment against the plaintiff determining that the
plaintiff had abandoned the contract and relinquished any right
that it had in the property.

The court granted plaintiff judg-

ment against the defendants1 counterclaim for slander of title-no
cause of action.
-1-

The court denied defendants1 motion to vacate the order
dismissing the defendants1 counterclaim.
In addition, the court denied plaintiff's motions for a
mistrial, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for a new
trial, and to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law.
m

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
m

The appellant seeks to have the judgment of abandonment of
the Uniform Real Estate Contract reversed and to have a decree

m

i
I

entered awarding specific performance to the appellant compelling
the respondents to convey good and sufficient title to the appel-

F

lant.
Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment of abandonment
and seek an order re-instating respondents1 counterclaim for
slander of title and remanding the counterclaim to the lower

•
•
I

court for trial.
i

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In September, 1957, Perry Harper and his wife Emily Harper
were aged 69 and 68 years respectively.

(R. 117)

They lived in

Lindon, Utah County, Utah, where they owned a tract of land

i
i
i
i

comprising approximately 71 acres, which property is the subject
matter of this action.
i

On September 18, 1957, Perry W. Harper and Emily D. Harper
entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract as sellers wherein

i
i

they contracted to sell the property to Karl B. Hale and Roy D.
Barrett for the sum of $35,000.00, (P. Ex. n l n , D. Ex. "15",
i

Finding of Fact No. 4).
Appellant, Timpanogos Highlands, Inc., was incorporated

i

December 8, 1964, and Karl B. Hale acted as president of the

i
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corporation until his death on May 24, 1969.

(R. 16-17).

Karl

B. Hale assigned his interest in the contract to the appellant,
Timpanogos Highlands, Inc., on February 21, 1965. That assignment was never recorded.

(P. Ex. "6", R. 23, 62). The appellant

recorded the Uniform Real Estate Contract, on the 1st day of May,
1972.

(P. Ex. "1", R. 60). Subsequently, the appellant recorded

an assignment from Roy A. Barrett and Ruth Redd Barrett which
assigned all their interests under the contract to the appellant.
That assignment was dated June 7, 1973, and was recorded by
appellant on December 27, 1973.

(P. Ex. "3", R. 63-64, Findings

of Fact Nos. 5, 21, 22). The respondents were never advised of
either of these assignments.

(R. 101-102, 130-131).

Perry W. Harper died May 14, 1966, and Emily D. Harper died
June 26, 1974.

(R. 118). Prior to his death, Perry W. Harper

transferred all right, title and interest which he held in the
contract property to Emily D. Harper and Max D. Harper by a deed
dated March 11, 1959.

(P. Ex. "2", R. 120, Finding of Fact No.

6) . Upon the death of Emily D. Harper, Max D. Harper succeeded
to all of her interest by reason of the fact that he was a joint
tenant with her in the ownership of the property.

(P. Ex. "2",

Finding of Fact No. 7 ) .
By the terms of the contract the appellant was to pay
$3,000.00 per year and pay the taxes and water assessments upon
the property.

(P. Ex. "1", R. 57, Finding of Fact No. 8).

Between September 17, 1957, and November, 1968, the appellant and
its predecessors made payments on the contract totaling $24,150.00.
(P. Ex.

,f H

9 ).

From November, 1968, to the time this lawsuit was

instituted, the appellant failed to pay any amount on the contract.
-3-

(R. 56). During the life of the contract, the appellant also
failed to pay any of the taxes due upon the property and failed
to pay $25,581.52 in installments due.

(P. Ex. "21", R. 132).

As of the date this action commenced, the appellant was delinquent
in the payment of installments and interest upon the property in

*
i

the amount of $34,523.30 and was delinquent in the payment of
•

taxes due upon the property in the amount of $4,413.70.

(P. Ex.

"9", "21", Finding of Fact No. 9).
The taxes on the property increased drastically from $69.29
in 1966 to $1,475.13 in 1967.

(R. 126). Because of the increase

•
!
i

in the taxes, the appellant by and through its president, Karl B.
Hale, told the respondents in December, 1968, that he would not
be able to keep the property and that he would have to let it go.

f

(R. 126-128, 144-145, Finding of Fact No. 12). In December,

'

1968, Karl B. Hale was telephoned by Ruby Harper West, a sister

i

to Max D. Harper and a daughter of Emily D. Harper.

During that

telephone conversation Mr. Hale told Mrs. Harper that because of

I
j

the increased tax assessment,, he felt that he would have to

,

abandon the property.

(R. 232). The respondents relied upon the

assertion of the appellant that it intended to abandon the pro-

'
i

perty and leased the same for a period of ten (10) years to
i

William Mack Walker on December 12, 1968.

(D. Ex. "4", R. 145,

Finding of Fact No. 13).
At no time from the signing of the contract to the present
has the appellant or its predecessors been in physical or constructive possession of the property.

(R. 53-56, Finding of Fact

No. 13).
The following contacts were the only contacts made between
-4-

j

the appellant and the respondents during the period of May,
1969, to January, 1973:
(1)

In the summer of 1969, Mr. Paul B. Tanner, C.P.A. and

secretary-treasurer of the appellant, made some contact with the
respondents.

The contact was made merely to obtain respondents1

opinion as to what the remaining balance was on the contract.
(R. 252).
(2)

The next contact was made by Lynn G. Hale in December,

1969, or January, 1970.

(R. 29, 90, 145). Mr. Hale made the

contact as the successor president of Timpanogos Highlands, Inc.
The substance of the conversation on that date is disputed.
(R. 29, 85-86, 132, 136, 145).
(3)
of 1970.
Harper.

The respondents were not contacted again until December
At that time, Mr. Hale made a written proposal to Mr.
(D.Ex. " 5 " , R. 30-32, R. 82-83, 136).

That proposal states as follows:
From proceeds of coming sale we will pay
(about 30 Jan) $1,500.
From proceeds of next sale will pay (about
A p r ) 1 $1,000. 3 mos. later we will pay
$625 & $625 thereafter each 3 mos.
At least by the time we realize income
from Lindon Development we will pay $3,000
per year as per contract and as sales permit amts in excess of contract to bring it
current. Till paid in full.
Timpanogos Highlands
/ s / Lynn G. Hale
•^The phrase "about Apr." conflicts with the phrase "about a yr"
as stated in appellant's brief. (App. Brief, 5-6, 14) Apparently,
appellant's counsel had difficulty reading Exhibit "5".Lynn B. Hale,
who wrote the document, read the document in Court and stated that
the document said "about April One Thousand Dollars." (R. 82).

-5-

The respondents understood Mr. Hale's appearance and written
memorandum as a new offer.

(R. 133-134, 145-146).

indicated he would take the offer to his family.
(4)
1972.

Mr. Harper
(R. 146, 3 1 ) .

No further contact was made by appellant until January,

At that time, Mr. Harper told Mr. Hale to contact the

respondents1 attorney.
(5)

(R. 32, 91, 147-148).

Mr. Hale finally contacted the respondents' attorney,

Mr. Cassity, in March of 1972.
(6)

(R. 33-34, 39-42, 84).

A year later, January 1973, appellant again contacted

respondents' attorney.

The attorney, Mr. Cassity, told Mr. Hale

that it was the intention of the Harper family to take the
property back; that the sale had failed.

(R. 188). The attorney

also requested Mr. Hale to compute a payoff figure and send it to
him which was done.

(R. 43).

Mr. Cassity presented the proposed balance to the Harper
family as an offer of conciliation or settlement.

The Harpers

told Mr. Cassity that they felt they should have the property v
back in light of appellant's abandonment by its failure to make
payments or pay the taxes.
(7)

(R. 188-189, 191-192).

Additional conversations and correspondence occurred

between the attorneys of the parties between February, 1973,
and the end of April, 1973.
(8)

(R. 45, 88).

In late April, 1973, Mr. Hale took a cashier's check in

the amount of $30,384.25, payable to Timpanogos Highlands, Inc.,
to Mr. Harper and offered it as a tender to pay off the contract.
Mr. Harper rejected the payment.
(9)

(P. Ex. 7, R. 48-49, 148).

Finally, in late April or early May, 1973, Mr. Hale

telephoned Mr. Cassity and was informed that Mr. Harper had a new
-6-

attorney, Mr. Jackson Howard.

Mr. Hale called Mr. Howard and was

informed that the Harpers were going to rely upon the appellant's
abandonment of the contract.

(R. 47, 82).

Mr. Hale then contacted his attorney and this action was
instituted.

(R. 48).
ARGUMENT

The appellant, in its brief, correctly characterizes the
argument on appeal as one involving questions of fact and not one
involving questions of law.

"Argument centers in appellant's

contention that the undisputed and uncontradicted evidence before
the trial court does not fairly preponderate in favor of an
abandonment as found by the court.11

(Appellant's brief p. 8).

The appellant further states that its "Argument seeks to
illuminate the many undisputed factors evidencing a lack of
abandonment as well as touching upon areas of contradictory
evidence which appellant contends is unbelievable as presented by
respondent."

(Appellant's brief p.8).

Unfortunately, appellant fails to distinguish for the court
the disputed from the undisputed facts.

Indeed, in this respect

the appellant misleads the court throughout its brief.

Almost

the entire statement of facts as written by the appellant is
supported only by references to testimony of witnesses called by
the appellant or by exhibits introduced by the appellant.
It is obvious from the record that the plaintiff, in assembling its brief on appeal, recited
facts favorable only to its own interests and
claims, some of which appear to have been out of
context with the whole record. Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah2d 129, 493 P.2d 639 (1972).
It was held by this Court in Thomson, supra, that appellants
cannot cite only the evidence most favorable to their position.
-7-

We believe there was ample evidence, competent and admissible, that supported the trial
court (in which event we must affirm) that the
presumption of its correctness was duly supported, that the plaintiffs did not point up where
the findings were not supported by evidence,
which they must, that plaintiffs1 chose to recite evidence most favorable to its contention
to the exclusion of other evidence favorable to
defendants, which is not permissable on appellate review, and that in any event the evidence
upon which they relied was a stranger to the
clear and convincing evidence demanded in a
case like this, and we so hold*
Since the appellant's appeal centers around an attempt to
have this court reverse the factual judgment of the court below,
it is appellant's duty to state the undisputed and disputed facts
as clearly and objectively as possible.

This the appellant has

failed to do*
In responding to the points in appellant's brief, the respondents indicate where appellant has misconstrued the facts, set
forth the applicable law, show what evidence on testimony was
introduced at trial and demonstrate how that evidence on testimony affects the points raised by the appellant.
POINT I
IN REVIEWING AN EQUITY CASE, THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT UNLESS CLEARLY AGAINST
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
In an equity case, the reviewing court may consider and
weigh all of the evidence, but will not reverse the trial court's
findings unless such findings are against the clear weight of the
evidence or contrary to law or established principles of equity•
Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah2d 356, 412 P.2d 314, 315 (1966)•
v. Corbet, 24 Utah2d 378, 472 P.2d 430, 432 (1970.

Corbet

West v. West,

16 Utah2d 411, 403 P.2d 22, 23 (1965).

While it is the duty and

privilege of the court to review both law and facts, due consideration should be given to the opinion of the trial court judge
who hears the evidence and sees the witnesses.

Provo City v.

Jacobsen, 111 Utah 68, 176 P.2d 130, 131 (1947).

It is a well

recognized rule of law that the burden is on the appellant to
establish error on the part of the trial court.

Such error must

be clear and unequivocal and unless the appellant can show that
the lower court's decision was totally unjustified, the reviewing
court has no alternative but to affirm.
P.2d 697 (Utah 1974).

Searle v. Searle, 522

Guard v. Maricopa County, 14 Ariz. App.

187, 481 P.2d 873 (1971).
This case was considered by an advisory jury which found for
respondents, and the decision of the jurors was adopted by the
trial court.

In effect, two distinct judgments were rendered,

and such judgments should not be lightly overruled.

In its

brief, the appellant has only argued questions of fact about
which reasonable men might differ.

These facts were determined

by the jury and the trial court judge to preponderate in respondents1 favor.
Respondents submit that appellant has not met its obligation
to show that the trial court was in error.

Many of the facts

which are stated in appellant's brief as ultimate facts are in
reality disputed facts which were debated and contested in the
lower court.

Appellant offers little proof that the trial court

erred in finding that the preponderance of the evidence favored
respondents.

Unless the appellant presents a clear and persua-

sive analysis of the trial court's failure to reach a correct
-9-

conclusion on the basis of the evidence, the judgment of the
lower court should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED BUYERS HAD ABANDONED THE CONTRACT.
Abandonment is not capable of a precise definition.

It

comprises many variables and must be determined on a case by case
basis as particular circumstances and facts dictate.

As defined

by Tucker v. Edwards, 376 P.2d 253, 255 (Okl. 1962), "The elements
of abandonment consist of an intention to abandon, plus an overt
or 'external1 act by which the intention is carried into effect."
According to 68 ALR2d 590, Anno:

Land Contract-Abandonment by

Vendee §3, the acts relied on as evidence of abandonment by the
vendee must be "positive, unequivocal, and inconsistent with the
existence of a contract,"

Respondents contend that these cri-

teria are met and the evidence conclusively shows abandonment of
the contract by the appellant.
In its brief, appellant lists the elements that are frequently considered in determining whether or not abandonment has
occurred.

This list of elements is purportedly taken from 1

Am.Jur.2d, Abandoned, Lost, Etc., Property §1; however, that
section does not contain the specifications elaborated by appellant.

Respondents are not apprised of appellant's source and

authority for these elements, but at any rate, appellant's list
is incomplete.

Respondents contend that two other factors to

consider are whether or not the purchaser has defaulted on payments and whether or not the value of the land in dispute has
increased since the purchaser's default.
-10-

6 8 ALR2d, 5 84-5 Anno:

Land Contract-Abandonment by Vendee, §2. This latter element
reflects upon the motive and good faith of the buyer.

Thus a

more complete list reads as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Possession or lack of possession of the real property
by the purchaser,
Lapse of time without claiming or using the property,
Failure to pay the taxes,
Failure to make installment payments,
Increased value of the land,
Declaration of an intention to abandon by the purchaser.

Appellant maintains that lack of possession, lapse of time
without making a claim, and failure to pay taxes are not determinative of the question of abandonment.

Appellant does not cite

any case law in support of its contentions or legal theories.
Despite appellant's failure to cite any case law as authority for
its position, respondents agree that these factors, individually
considered, need not be determinative in the context of a particular case.

Nevertheless, these are certainly valid and impor-

tant factors which, considered together, may strongly suggest
that abandonment has occurred.

Thus, the failure of the pur-

chaser to be in possession need not be determinative of abandonment if other requirements of the contract have been met.

In

this case, however, the appellant was not in possession of the
property, consistently made late and inadequate payments on the
contract, refused to pay the taxes, defaulted entirely for a sixyear period, expressed its intention to abandon the property, and
only sought enforcement of the contract after the value of the
property had gone up.

Each of these elements existing in conjunc-

tion with the others was sufficient and substantial evidence to
justify the jury in finding that appellant had in fact abandoned
the contract.
-11-

In its brief, appellant admits it has never been in possession of the property, has never used the property, and has never
paid taxes on the property.

Appellant contends that such failure

to possess or use the land or pay taxes was excused by reason of
a subsequent oral agreement that existed between purchaser and
sellers*

te
p

The argument that appellant forwards is that it agreed
P

to relinquish the right to possess and use the land and in consi-

j

deration thereof the sellers agreed to pay the property taxes.

$

The original written contract expressly provided that the

"

purchaser was to pay the property taxes.

(P. Ex. "1").

Despite

I

I
this express agreement, appellant insists that the subsequent
I
oral agreement vitiates the written contract in this respect.
Even supposing that this later agreement existed, it is a well-

(

known rule of law that a subsequent oral agreement which modifies

'

or varies the terms of the original contract is violative of

'

the parole evidence rule and the statute of frauds.
The question of whether there ever was a subsequent oral

j

agreement modifying the original contract so that the "sellers

,

would possess the property and in consideration therefor would

'

pay the taxes" (Appellant's brief, p. 10), was one of the most

'

hotly debated issues at trial.

(R. 172-181, 244-245).

Further-

more, almost all of page eleven of appellant's brief is a mischaracterization of the facts.

!

j

Appellant claims that the pur-

ported agreement as to taxes and possession was the basis for
respondents entering into a lease agreement with Mack Walker in
2

The respondents objected at the trial to the admissibility
of the subsequent oral agreement because it was "testimony attempting to vary the terms of a written instrument, it violates the
parole evidence rule." The objection was overruled. (R. 237-233).
-12-

I

1968,

The respondents contend, however, that the basis for the

lease was the fact that Karl B. Hale told Mr. Harper that he "was
going to have to give up the contract, that he had more than a
man could handle."

(R. p. 179). Thus, appellant's statement of

facts concerning this alleged agreement is in no way consistent
with the evidence presented at trial or with the findings of fact
of the lower court.
Non-use and non-possession of the property, as well as failure to pay the property taxes, were factors which the jury considered
as evidence of appellant's abandonment of the contract.
Appellant also contends that no lapse of time occurred
wherein purchaser did not claim the property.

Appellant supports

this allegation by insisting that:
(1)

$24,150.00 was paid on the contract; and '

(2)

Since 1968 there were repeated contacts between pur-

chaser and sellers and such contacts purportedly renewed purchasers
claims.
Respondents do not dispute that purchaser has paid $24,150.00
on the contract.

However, evidence was introduced to show that

payments made by appellant to achieve this sum were erratic at
best.

(P. Ex. "21").

Appellant, consistently made late and

deficient payments between September, 1957, and November, 1968.
At times the payments did not even cover the interest due on the
installments.

(P. Ex. "21").

While payment of this sum may

suggest that appellant had a claim to the property, appellant's
later default coupled with its failure to meet the other terms of
the contract vitiated that claim.

Appellant's total failure to

make any payments whatsoever on the property after 1968 lends
-13-

credence to the assumption that appellant abandoned any claim it
had to the property.
Appellant also declares that since purchaser maintained some
communication with the sellers between 1957 and 1968, such contact
was sufficient to reinstate appellant's claim to the property.
It must be noted that any contact between purchaser and sellers
was sporadic at best, and each contact was followed by long
periods of silence and inaction by the purchaser.

Appellant

alleges that correspondence and telephone conversations regarding
the contract occurred during the summer of 1969.

(App. Br. 6-7).

In December, 1969, Mr. Hale met with Mr. Harper concerning the
contract but nothing came of the meeting.

Mr. Hale met with Mr.

Harper once more in December, 1970,-a year later.

They discussed

the contract and Mr. Hale wrote a memo reflecting the discussion.
Appellant made no attempt to meet the terms indicated in that
memo.

Over a year later, in January of 1972, some correspondence

concerning the contract transpired between the parties and their
attorneys.

Then in January and February of 1973, Mr. Hale

allegedly contacted sellers1 attorney regarding a payoff figure.
Unable to reach a settlement with sellers1 attorney, Mr. Hale
computed his own payoff figure (which was incorrect) and presented a check to seller in April of 1973.

The check was not

made out to sellers, but, in fact, was made out to Timpanogos
Investment Company, Inc.

Finally, a month after sellers refused

to accept purchaser's purported tender, purchaser initiated this
suit for specific performance.
Despite appellant's complicated and detailed analysis of the
various communications between purchaser and sellers, the undeni-14-

able fact remains that purchaser never performed according to the
contract.

Purchaser defaulted on every installment due between

1968 and 1974. Purchaser absolutely failed to meet any of the
terms that it had proposed in its 1970 memorandum*

Appellant's

argument that purchaser made these contacts in an effort to discover from sellers what payments were required to fulfill the
contract is totally without merit.

Appellant had a copy of the

original contract and was familiar with its terms.
cords reflecting past payments on the property.

It had re-

It even retained

an accountant to compute the payments due and owing.

(R. 251-257).

Sellers in no way prevented purchaser from performing the terms
of the contract.
It is a well recognized rule that "conduct manifesting an
intention to abandon is sufficient if the conduct of one party
is inconsistent with continued existence of the contract and
that conduct is known to and acquiesced in by the other."

In Re

Estate of Lyman, 7 Wash. App. 945, 503 P.2d 1127, 1131 (1972).
Martinson v. Publisher's Forest Products Company, 11 Wash. App.
42, 521 P.2d 233, 237 (1974).

Respondents maintain that appel-

lant's continual failure to make payments to cover either principal or interest after 1968 is conduct inconsistent with the
terms of the contract and conclusively demonstrates abandonment.
When default in payments occurs in conjunction with one
or more of the other factors mentioned:

failure to be in pos-

session, failure to use or make improvements on the property,
failure to pay the property taxes; then abandonment is almost
certain to be found.
In Mason v. Hasso, 90 Ariz. 1926, 367 P.2d 1, 5 (1961), the
-15-

appellant contracted to purchase realty but after putting $100
down failed to pay the balance on the down payment, and failed to
pay the subsequent installments, taxes, or interest on the property.

Appellants had also notified respondents that they could

not meet their obligations.

Appellants sought enforcement of the

contract after the value of the property rose and a third party
offered to buy it from them.

The court found that these acts and

omissions by the plaintiff signified complete abandonment of the
property.

The appellate court affirmed the judgment for the

sellers.
In Tucker v. Edwards, supra, the plaintiff had entered into
a contract of sale with defendants in 1946 and gone into possession of the property.

Payments were delinquent and failed

completely between 1956 and 1960 when the plaintiff filed suit.
Some years prior to initiating the suit, the plaintiff had
vacated the property.

The court found that plaintiff's conduct

was sufficient to show he had abandoned the contract.
The court in Sturm v. Heim, 95 Ariz. 300, 389 P.2d 702
(1964), denied the purchaser's request for specific performance
notwithstanding the fact that 89% of the purchase price had been
paid and purchaser had gone into possession.

The court based its

decision on the fact that purchaser had been in default for 7
years and the contract provided that payments must be made punctually.

The court also said that subsequent negotiations during

those seven years did not revive the contract.
Other cases to the same effect are Narut v. Williams, 239
Mich. 376, 292 NW 336 (1940), Ahlstrand v. McPherson, 285 Minn.
398, 173 NW2d 330 (1969) [court said purchasers had abandoned the
-16-

contract because they had not taken possession, had not paid
taxes for four years, and had been in default for 33 months on
installment payments.].

Mathwig v. Ostrand, 132 Minn. 346, 157 N>/W.

589 (1916), Powell v. Codifer and Bonnabel, Inc., 167 La. 97, 118
S. 817 (1928).

At any rate, whether or not appellant's repeated

defaults constitute abandonment is a question of fact.

The trier

of fact in the present case concluded that appellant had indeed
abandoned the contract.
Finally, the fact that the value of the property increased
greatly between the time of appellant's default and its suit for
specific performance suggests bad faith and improper motive on
the part of appellant.

68 ALR2d 596 Anno:

Land Contract -

Abandonment by Vendee, §4(d) declares:
Not infrequently a vendee's assertion of rights
under the land contract does not take place until the .value of the property has increased.

i

The following are cases in which a rise in value was mentioned by the court as a reason for determining the contract had
been abandoned:
In Powell v. Codifer and Bonnabel, Inc., supra, the purchaser, who never went into possession or made improvements on
the land, defaulted in payments in 1918 after paying about half
the total purchase price.
party.

In 1921 the land was sold to a third

During the period of default, the land saw an increase of

seven times its original value.

The court held that the pur-

chaser abandoned the contract when she ceased making payments on
the land.
A similar situation occurred in Schluter v. Gentilly Terrace
Co., 164 La. 663, 114 So. 586 (1927).
-17-

The purchaser did not go

into possession of the land or make improvements on it*

Pur-

chaser's total payments amounted to less than 50% of the purchase
price of the property.

In 1922, the seller notified the pur-

chaser that he was 6 years delinquent in his payments and that
unless a substantial payment was made within 30 days, the contract would be cancelled.

The purchaser failed to comply with

this demand and the contract was cancelled.

The land increased

in value, and in 1925 the purchaser tendered to the seller the
balance due under the contract.

When refused, the purchaser

initiated this suit for specific performance.

The court observed

that the purchaser could not be allowed to play the role of
"watchful waiting" through a period of years and only perform his
obligations under the contract in order to reap at a late date
the benefits of its increased value.
Again, in Glenn v. Lowthar, 219 Ky. 383, 293 S.W. 947 (1927),
the land contract in question was ignored for 7 years.

The

buyers who were insolvent most of this time, made no payments on
the property and never took possession of the property.

When the

land increased in value and the buyers attempted to enforce the
contract, the court said that a purchaser may not lie by and lead
the other party to believe that he has abandoned the contract and
then, when the land has increased in value 20 times, claim the
benefit of the contract he decided not to claim before the land
rose in value.

See also Attebury v. Aulick, 204 Okla. 540, 231

P.2d 993 (1951), Mason v.Hasso, supra, 90 Ariz. 126, 367 P.2d 1
(1961).
Respondents maintain that appellant should be estopped from
reaping the benefits of the contract after violating its terms
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for so many years.

The fact that the land in contention has

increased substantially in value since appellant's last payment
over 6 years ago is indicative of appellant's bad faith and
questionable motive in purporting to tender the balance due under
the contract at such a late date*
In Part (D) of Point II of its brief appellant asserts that
there is no credible evidence that a stated intention to abandon
the property was ever made; further, that any statement by Karl
B. Hale, deceased, is inadmissable under the terms of the Utah
Dead Man's Statute and that Karl B. Hale had no authority to
abandon the property as agent for the corporation.

Respondents

answer and submit that:
(1)

The testimony concerning statements by Karl B. Hale is

not barred by the Utah Dead Man's Statute, and
(2)

A stated intention to abandon is not necessary/as in-

tent to abandon may be implied and inferred from all. the circumstances and the conduct of the parties.
Appellant argues that testimony by Max Harper and Ruby
Harper West concerning statements made to them by Karl B. Hale,
deceased/ should not have been admitted into evidence by the
trial court. (App. Br. 19-20).

Appellant claims that the testi-

mony should have been barred by the Utah Dead Man's Statute,
U.C.A. §78-24-2 (3).
The dead man statutes have largely been eliminated in the
past century.

The harsh and irrational application of these

rules to prevent any interested party from testifying has been
widely recognized.

In England, "no shred of disqualification in

civil cases remains."

McCormick on Evidence, 4th Ed., §65, p.
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142.

Despite the trend away from such rigorous rules, many

states retain statutes which bar testimony by interested parties
concerning claims against the estate of a deceased party.

Such

statutes have been regarded as necessary to restrain the temptation to give false testimony. . ."

Maxfield v. Sainsbury 110
«

Utah 280, 172 P.2d 122 (1946).

Most commentators now agree that
i

refusal to listen to one who may have a claim against the estate

j

of a deceased person works more injustice than the evil to be

,

prevented. 2 Wigmore, Evidence, §578.

'

As a result, courts

strictly construe the dead man statutes and limit them to the

'
i

specific exclusions contained therein.
!

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the validity of these
arguments against the dead man1s statute.

In Morrison v. Walker

,
j

Bank & Trust Co., 11 Utah2d 416/ 360 P.2d 1015 (1961), this Court

'

ruled that the statute. . .

\

limits the introduction of testimony which
might be of value in determining the ultimate truth and, therefore, should be narrowly construed. Id. at 1017.

|
j
i

See also Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P.2d 571 (1950).
In Morrison, supra, the Court found that the testimony in
question was not specifically disqualified by the statute
was, therefore, admissible.

and

Respondents submit that the facts in

this case present the identical issue presented in Morrison.
The trial court specifically questioned the appellant concerning the applicability of the dead man's statute to this case.
Appellant1s lawyer admitted that his client did not fall within
the provisions specified by the court because Timpanogos Highlands, Inc., is a grantee of the deceased.
-20-

(R. 125, 224).

I
]

I

Since the statute requires that the adverse party be an administrator, heir, legatee, or devisee of a deceased person, appellant
clearly does not come within the provisions of the statute.
On appeal, appellant has attempted to circumvent the rulings
of the Supreme Court and the express language of the statute by
arguing that the statute should be liberally construed.

This

argument is contrary to the policies and precedents of this
Court.

If appellant were permitted his argument, testimony by

any interested persons would be barred.

Such a decision, respondents

submit, would clearly conflict with the modern tendency to abandon
the dead manfs statute or strictly interpret it. This tendency
away from disqualification is supported by the Model Code of
Evidence, the Uniform Rules of Evidence and the Revised Draft of
Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and
Magistrates*
Appellant also argues that the testimony concerning statements by Karl B. Hale is inadmissible hearsay.

Appellant's

contention is that Karl B. Hale had transferred his interest in
the property in 1965 and had no interest in the property at the
time the statements were made.

Appellant fails to mention that

in 1968 Karl B. Hale was the president of Timpanogos Highlands,
Inc., a family corporation.

His agency to act for the corpora-

tion is thus readily apparent.

The assignment from Hale to the

appellant was never recorded and was not known to the respondents
at the time he expressed his intention to abandon the contract.
(P. Ex. "6",

R. 23, 62, 101-102, 130-131).

Appellant alleges agency on the part of Karl Hale to make
the payments of 1968 but denies his agency to make any declara-21-

tion in that year concerning abandonment.

Appellant must either

admit that Karl B. Hale acted on behalf of Timpanogos Highlands,
Inc. as its agent or maintain that none of his acts were sanetioned by the corporation.

>
' *

As president of Timpanogos Highlands, Inc., Karl B. Hale was
i

a duly constituted agent for that corporation.

Any declarations

against his interest or that of the corporation are admissible as

i

exceptions to the hearsay rule.

i

The testimony by Max Harper and

Ruby Harper West was properly admitted as declarations against
interest and is not barred by the Utah Dead Man's Statute.

f

\

At any rate, a stated intention to abandon is not necessary.
j

Numerous cases support the theory that intent is implied from the

i

objection behavior of the parties to a contract.

\

In Cords v.

Window Rock School District, No. 8, Apache Co., 22 Ariz.App. 223,
526 P.2d 757 (1974), the court said:

"Abandonment is a matter of

\

intent and can be infered from the conduct of the parties and the
!

attendant circumstances."

This principle is echoed in C & W

Electric, Inc. v. Casa Dorado Corp., 523 P.2d 137 (Colo. App.
1974) .

j
i

In Re Estate of Lyman, supra; Martinson v. Publisher's

Forest Products Co., supra.
(

Respondents submit that appellant's behavior is inconsistent
with the contract and appellant's intent to abandon the contract
may be inferred by the following:
1. Appellant was never in possession of the property?
2.

Appellant never used the property and failed to assert a

valid claim to the property between 1968 and 1974;
3.

Appellant failed to pay the property taxes;

4.

Appellant consistently made inadequate and delinquent
-22-

j

payments and finally defaulted altogether between 19 68 and 1974;
5.

Appellant attempted performance only after the value of

the land increased dramatically;
6.

Appellant, through Karl B. Hale, did explicitly state

an intention to abandon the contract.
In Martin v. Butter, 209 P.2d 636, 638 (Cal., 1949) the
court said:
Any words or acts by one party which indicate that he will not perform the contract or permit the other party to do so, amounts to an abandonment. Thus a party may abandon a contract by
refusing to proceed further with its fulfillment,
and his breach of the contract, if material, justifies the other party in treating the contract as
abandoned and in abandoning it himself. In such
case, abandonment by one party is eguivilent to a
claim of rescission which may be acquiesced in by
the other, thereby effecting a mutual rescission, no
formal rescission being necessary after one has acknowledged his inability to perform and has voluntarily abandoned the contract.
These manifestations evincing appellant's intention to abandon the contract were presented to the trial court and that court
found that such intention could be inferred from the evidence.
similar dispute arose in Tucker v. Edwards, supra.

The appellate

court said:
We have not overlooked plaintiff's testimony,
emphasized in his brief, to the effect that he
never at any time intended to abandon the property. However, this conflict in the evidence was
resolved in defendants1 favor by the trial court,
and it is well settled that where the evidence
in a case of equitable cognizance is conflicting,
the trial court's finding thereon will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly against
the weight thereof. (Cites Bailey v. Lovin, 202
Okl. 17, 209 P.2d 994).
For the foregoing reasons, respondents submit that appellant's conduct clearly indicates an intention to abandon the
-23-

A

contract.

The decision of the trial court which confirmed

appellant's abandonment should not be disturbed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING PURCHASER'S TENDER
INADEQUATE AND IN ANY CASE, THE TENDER WAS NOT VALID AFTER PURCHASER HAD ABANDONED THE CONTRACT.
The trial court found that purchaser's tender was inadequate
and invalid.
Quoting from Finding of Fact 17:
17. On the 24th day of May, 19 73, the
plaintiff paid into Court the sum of $30,677.70,
for the tender of the delinquent amount owing on
the purchase price. The amount tendered was not
the amount owing on the purchase price and taxes
payable and was, in fact, deficient in the amount
of $1,515.31 and the defendant was not obligated
to accept the said tender nor was the said tender
adequate under the law. Further, the said tender
did not include any tender for $4,414.70 for
taxes or. water assessments owing. Further, such
tender did not include interest on taxes paid by
the defendant but for which the defendant was entitled to 9% per annum under the contract.
The tender by the appellant was not proper for several reasons:
(1)

The check offered by Mr. Hale was made out to Timpanogos

Investment Company and not to the respondents.

(P. Ex. "17",

R. 100).
(2)

The title of record was not in the name of the appel-

lant at the time of the tender.

The assignment from Karl Hale

to the appellant, although made prior to the tender, was never
recorded.
(3)

(P. Ex. "6", R. 23, 62).
The assignment from Roy A. Barrett and his wife to the

appellant was not even dated and consequently not recorded until
after the tender was made, and in fact, after this action was
-24-

commenced.

(P. Ex. "3", R. 63-64).

The appellant at the time

of the tender could have had no more that a one-half interest
in the property.
(4)

The respondents were not aware of the interest of the

appellant at the time of the tender and were never advised of
either of the assignments.

(R. 101-102, 130-131, 151).

It is evident that the tender by the appellant was deficient
in several respects and, therefore, the respondents had no
obligation to accept it.
Respondents maintain that regardless of the adequacy or inadequacy of the tender, appellant should not be allowed to tender
performance after having abandoned the contract.

As already

indicated, appellant had defaulted in payments for over six (6)
years.

Abandonment, by its very terms, means that the party

abandoning the contract has relinquished all his right, title and
interest under the contract.

Any expectation of recovering the

property is thereby irrevocably lost.

1 Am.Jur.2d, 3-4, Abandoned,

Lost, Etc. Property §1.

The lower court found that the appellant

abandoned the contract.

It should not then be permitted to en-

force the contract at its convenience and after the value of the
land had increased substantially.

The sufficiency of the tender,

then, is not the real issue; rather, it is whether the appellant
can be allowed to take advantage of the sellers without having
performed any of its obligations under the contract.

Respondents

submit that the trial court's refusal to acknowledge purchaser's
tender in light of purchaser's former conduct should be upheld by
this court.
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BRIEF OF COUNTER-APPELLANTS
POINT I
THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE THEIR COUNTER-CLAIM OF
SLANDER OF TITLE TRIED TO A COURT.
Subsequent to the abandonment of the property, the appellant
caused to be recorded on May 1, 1972, a Uniform Real Estate Contract,

It also recorded on December 27, 1973, (after the lawsuit

was commenced) an assignment from Roy A. and Ruth Barrett to the
appellant.

The assignment was dated June 7, 1973, although the

lawsuit was commenced May 24, 1973.

(P. Ex. "3", R. 63-64).

As

a consequence of the recording of these documents, the respondents answered appellant's suit for specific performance and in
addition, counter-claimed alleging that such a recording constituted a slander against their title.

Appellant made a motion

to dismiss respondent's counterclaim of slander of title, which
motion the Court granted, prior to submitting the matter to the
jury.

Respondents are now petitioning this Court to reinstate

their countersuit.
Slander of title is defined as a false and malicious statement, oral or written, made in disparagement of a person's title
to real or personal property, causing him injury.

The term is

employed to describe words or conduct which bring or intend to
bring in question another's right to title to particular property.

See 5 0 Am.Jur.2d, 105 8.

An annotation titled "Recording

of Instrument Purporting to Effect Title as Slander of Title", §1
in 39 ALR2d 840, 842, states:
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There is no doubt that the act of wrongfully filing of record an unfounded claim to
the property of another is actionable as slander of title, given the other elements of that
action, just as any other spoken or written
assertion reflecting on the plaintiff's ownership would be. And this is true although the
instrument recorded may be such that one learned
in the law would realize that the claim asserted
therein is unfounded, so long as it is one which
the ordinary purchaser would regard as clouding
plaintiff's title*
The case of Olsen v. Kidman, 120 Utah 443, 235 P.2d 510
(1951), involved a real estate broker who improperly recorded a
claim of lien upon the property of the plaintiff.

The Utah

Supreme Court, regarding the elements of a cause of action for
slander of title, said:
The defendant and appellant, Leslie Kidman,
contends that the Utah cases and the law generally regarding slander of title require that before liability can be found, the recorder of the
slanderous document must have known that he asserted a false claim without any foundation or right.
In Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., Utah , 208 P.2d 956,
and in Sproul v. Parks, Utah, 210 P.2d 436, the
facts recited indicate that the wrongful actions
were actuated by malice in fact. In the Dowse
case we said that the malicious filing for record
of an instrument known to be inoperative is regarded as slander of title.
[4] This does not mean that where the instrument is filed without a privilege or right
to do so that actual malice must be proved in
order to establish liability. The rule has
been clearly stated in Gudger v. Manton, 21
Cal.2d 537, 134 P.2d 217, and in Phillips v.
Glazer, 94 Cal.App.2d 673, 211 P.2d 37,40.
In the latter case, the court said: "Slander
of title is effected by one who without privilege publishes untrue and disparaging
statements with respect to the property of
another under such circumstances as would lead
a reasonable person to foresee that a prospective purchaser or lessee thereof might abandon
his intentions. Rest., Torts, sec. 624. It
is an invasion of the interest in the vendibility of property. In order to commit the
tort, actual malice or ill will is unnecessary.
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Gudger v. Manton [supra] Rest., Torts, sees.
624, 625, 628. To be disparaging, a statement need not be a complete denial of title
in others, but may be any unfounded claim of
an interest in the property which throws
doubt upon its ownership. Gudger v. Manton,
supra."
To this may be added the comment on clause
B of Restatement on Torts, sec. 625: It is
not necessary that the publisher of a disparaging statement know or believe it to be false
nor is it necessary that as a reasonable man
he should know or believe that it is untrue.
Furthermore it is immaterial that he has reasonable grounds for his belief in its truth. As
in an action for defamation, if the other essentials to liability are present, the publisher of disparaging matter takes the risk that it
is untrue.
For additional support, see Dowse v. Doris Trust Company,
116 Utah 106, 208 P.2d 956 (1949), which was another action for
slander of title in v/hich it was alleged by the owner of certain
real property that an instrument was recorded falsely and maliciously with an intent to encumber and cloud the owner's title.
The Utah Supreme Court said:
[2] In the Restatement of the Law on
Torts, Vol. Ill, Sec. 624, page 325, the
general rule as to what acts will make one
liable for slander of title is stated as
follows:
"One who, without privilege to do so,
publishes matter which is untrue and disparaging to another's property in land, chattels or intangible things under such circumstances as would lead a reasonable man to
forsee that the conduct of a third person
as purchaser or lessee thereof might be determined thereby is liable for pecuniary
loss resulting to the other from the impairment of vendibility thus caused."
In Pender v. Dowse, 1 Utah2d 283, 365 P.2d 644 (1954), another
slander of title action, the Utah Supreme Court said that for one
to be liable for slander of title, he must publish matter which
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is untrue and disparaging to another's property.
Malice is an element of the cause of action for slander of
title.

It is immaterial that one who records has reasonable

grounds for his belief that the instrument is true.
supra.

See Olsen,

%k
m

In Howarth v. Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d 183, 515 P.2d 442

m

(1973), the Utah Supreme Court stated that malice may be implied.
m

[1,2] It is generally held that malice is
an element of the cause of action for slander
of title. However, we concede the correctness
of plaintiffs1 argument that this does not require that it be affirmatively shown that the
wrong was done with an intent to injure, vex or
annoy, or because of hatred, spite or ill will.
The malice may be implied by the law, where a
party knowingly and wrongfully records or publishes something which is spurious or untrue,
or which gives a false or misleading impression,
adverse to another's title, under such circumstances that he should reasonably forsee might
result in damage to the property owner.
Appellant knew at the time of the recording of the contract

g

«
*
'
i
*
h
v

that the contract was void and misleading, that they had already

«

forfeited all rights in the property due to delinquency of pay-

l
I

ments and abandoment.
i

The malice requirement is easily met by the fact that the
recorded instrument is void.

The Utah court in Howarth v.

Ostergaard, supra, clearly held that the necessary malice is

i

no more than merely recording a misleading document which is

|

I

adverse to another's title and which the one recording should
reasonably forsee might result in damage to the property owner.
The respondents in the present case have suffered general
damages due to appellant's action in that they have had to
retain counsel.

They have suffered damage in that they cannot

sell the title to the land in its present condition.
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They have

j

suffered damage in that they cannot use the land as security with
the present cloud on the title.
Punitive damages should also be awarded in the instant case
due to the annoying nature of the suit.
The respondents should also recover their costs in defending
this suit and putting forth their counterclaim as well as receive
compensation for a reasonable attorney's fee.
It is well established in Utah that recovery of general
damages, punitive damages, attorneys fees and other costs are
recoverable in slander of title actions.
The action of slander of title is based on
a wrongful act but for which the plaintiff
would not have had to incur any expense, either
for costs or for attorney's fees.
Attorney's fees are certainly a reasonable expense of litigation.
. . . (P)unitive damages may be awarded
in an action for slander of title . . . Dowse
v. Doris Trust Co., supra.
The respondents1 counterclaim was sufficient to state a
claim for slander of title within the law set forth above.
Respondents submit that it was improper for the lower court to
dismiss their counterclaim as a matter of law when sufficient
facts exist to constitute slander of title.
CONCLUSION
The appellant has failed to maintain its burden on appeal of
showing that the judgment of the trial court was against the
clear weight of the evidence.

A reading of the transcript and

an.examination of the exhibits will demonstrate to this court
that there was sufficient evidence presented from which the advisory jury and the judge could find that the contract had been
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abandoned*

For this reason, the judgment of the lower court of

abandonment of the contract by the appellant should be affirmed*
Additionally, the respondents have alleged facts in their
counterclaim for slander of title, which if proven, would constitute a slander of title as defined in the case law of this state.
For this reason, the counterclaim of slander of title should be
reinstated and remanded to the lower court for trial.

^6^
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